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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Daniel A. Ligon-Bruno appeals from a judgment of conviction for destruction, 
alteration, or concealment of evidence based on his conditional guilty plea entered after 
the denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, Mr. Ligon-Bruno asserts that the 
district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence found during three 
warrantless searches of his home because the State failed to satisfy its "heavy burden" 
of proving an exception to the warrant requirement. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
This case began when law enforcement officers responded to a "burglary in 
progress" call at Mr. Ligon-Bruno's apartment. (Tr.VoLl,1 p.9, Ls.11-21; p.30, Ls.5-12.) 
A witness had called 911 to report seeing a man crawl through an outside window, open 
the front door, unscrew the front light bulb, reenter the apartment through the door, and 
leave through the window. (Tr.Vol. I, p.10, Ls.4-12.) Deputy Franssen of the Kootenai 
County Sheriff's Department was the last of four law enforcement officers who initially 
responded to the call. 2 (Tr.Vol.I, p.11, Ls.10-13, p.87, Ls.23-25.) By the time Deputy 
Franssen arrived, another deputy had stopped the suspect, 3 who claimed to be a 
1 Two transcripts were prepared for appeal. One contains transcripts from hearings on 
the motion to suppress conducted on June 18 and June 23, 2010, as well as the guilty 
plea and sentencing hearings, held on February 7, 2011, and March 23, 2011, 
respectively. For ease of reference, appellate counsel has labeled that transcript as 
volume I. The other transcript is from another hearing on the motion to suppress held 
on October 1, 2010, which appellate counsel has labeled as volume II. 
2 The other three officers were Deputy Bixby, Deputy Moffett, and Deputy Ellis. 
Fr.Vol.I, p.87, Ls.23-25.) Another officer, Detective Brandel, arrived later. (Tr.Vol.I, p. 
The suspect was later identified as "Mr. Steger." (Tr.Vol. I, p.41, Ls.5-11.) 
1 
resident of the apartment, in front of the apartment complex. 4 (Tr.Vol.I, p.13, L.23 -
p.14, L.23.) 
Deputy Franssen, accompanied by Deputy Bixby, then approached the second-
floor apartment to investigate. They noticed that the window, which was obscured by 
mini-blinds, was open approximately one to two inches, with a small security camera "in 
between two of the miniblinds." (Tr.Vol.I, p.14, L.24- p.17, L.1.) They then conducted 
a "knock and announce," in which Deputy Franssen knocked on the front door and 
announced, in a "[l]oud" voice, that he was with the sheriff's department, and, having 
received no response, Deputy Bixby knocked on the window, and "yelled in through the 
open portion of the window" in a "[l]oud" voice. Deputy Bixby testified that they 
"pound[ed] the door" and "yell[ed]: 'Sheriff's Department. Open up."' (Tr.Vol.I, p.95, 
Ls.24-25.) After receiving no response, Deputy Franssen went downstairs to speak with 
Mr. Steger to find out if there was anyone else in the apartment. Mr. Steger gave 
conflicting answers, first denying that anyone else was in the apartment, then admitting 
that his roommates might be inside, before again denying that anyone else was inside. 
Deputy Bixby remained upstairs and "maintained a visual on the apartment[.]" (Tr.Vol.I, 
p.14, L.24 - p.20, L.6.) 
The Initial Contact With Mr. Ligon-Bruno 
Next, Deputy Bixby, accompanied by Deputy Ellis, "slid the window open[] [and] 
pushed the blinds out of the way so we could get a clear view into the apartment." 
Deputy Bixby later acknowledged that his hands had entered the apartment in order to 
move the blinds. (Tr.Vol.I, p.120, Ls.8-10.) He then announced that the sheriff's 
4 Mr. Steger matched the description, both with respect to physical characteristics and 
clothing, of the person described by the 911 caller. (Tr.Vol.I, p.41, Ls.8-11.) 
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department was there, asked if anyone was inside, and ordered anyone inside to come 
out. At that point, Mr. Ligon-Bruno appeared, "peeked his head out around the corner 
[and] [a]sked what are we doing there?" Deputy Bixby told him to "'[s]tep this 
direction[,]"' and, when he started for the door, ordered him to exit through the window. 
(Tr.Vol.I, p.96, L.8 - p.99, L.5.) 
Deputy Franssen testified that, while interviewing Mr. Steger downstairs, he 
heard Deputy Bixby "yelling: 'Let me see your hands."' Deputy Franssen's reaction was 
to run upstairs, at which point he observed Deputy Bixby and another deputy "having a 
male step out of the window that was now open onto the balcony where he was 
detained." In further questioning, Deputy Franssen described, in greater detail, the 
process by which Mr. Ligon-Bruno exited the apartment. He explained, "He was being 
assisted out of the window. He wasn't being pulled to the extent that he was completely 
off balance ... I believe deputies maintained control of his hands ... while maintaining 
control of his ability to cause harm to officers, he was brought out of the window." 
(Tr.Vol.I, p.22, Ls.9-23.) That man was verbally-identified as Mr. Ligon-Bruno, placed in 
handcuffs, and asked whether anyone else was in the apartment. Mr. Ligon-Bruno then 
"stated that Luca was still inside the apartment." Mr. Ligon-Bruno also indicated that he 
had been asleep inside before he went to the window. Deputy Franssen then called for 
Luca to exit the apartment. Luca exited the apartment, and was detained in handcuffs. 
(Tr.Vol.I, p.19, L.7 - p.25, L.6.) 
The apartment complex to which the police had responded was one of two 
"[r]elatively small" complexes that are next to each other. Each complex has fewer than 
fifteen apartments, and both are located on a single block "on the north side of 
Wyoming Avenue[.]" (Tr.Vol.I, p.77, Ls.4-9.) Prior to anyone entering Mr. Ligon-Bruno's 
3 
apartment (Tr.Vol.I, p.82, Ls.10-20), police attempted to verify Mr. Steger's claim that he 
lived in the apartment by calling his mother. According to Deputy Franssen, 
Central dispatch contacted her by telephone. And she was able to provide 
that she knew that he lived in an apartment across from Ziggy's, which is 
on the south side of Wyoming but no particular number or couldn't even 
identify to the best of my knowledge which apartment complex it was. 
(Tr.Vol.I, p.80, Ls.3-19.) 
Initial Entry Into The Apartment 
Deputy Bixby testified that. after Luca, Mr. Ligon-Bruno, and Mr. Steger were 
handcuffed, he entered the apartment through the window. After Deputy Bixby's entry 
through the window, it was discovered that the reason that the front door was not being 
used as the main entrance was because it had been taped shut after a recent break-in. 
(Tr.Vol.I, p.66, Ls.8-16.) 
Leaving the other deputies outside, Deputy Bixby testified, 
[I] [w]alked straight into the apartment towards the hallway, cleared the 
kitchen, which was the first room adjacent to the living room. Looking 
down the hallway the bedroom was the next door on the left. There was, I 
believe, a closet somewhere in the hallway. 
(Tr.Vol.I, p.101, Ls.12-19.) Deputy Bixby said that he did this "to make sure nobody 
else was inside the house" and described it as "a quick sweep[.]" (Tr.Vol.I, p.101, L.23 
- p.102, L.7.) 
During this sweep, Deputy Bixby noticed several items, including "burnt 
marijuana cigarettes, rolling papers" and "a soda can or energy drink can ... that was 
punctured ... [andJ had burnt residue on it made for smoking." He also noticed 
"numerous weapons . . . in the living room and throughout the house[,]" including 
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baseball bats, knives, and a hatchet.5 He described both bedrooms as "just a mess." 
(Tr.Vol.I, p.103, L.22 - p.104, L.18.) On cross-examination, the following exchange 
occurred: 
[Defense counsel:] When you made that sweep, sir, that first sweep as 
counsel puts it, what indications did you find that 
would lead you to believe that someone else was 
armed or dangerous or anything like that inside the 
residence? 
[Deputy Bixby:] Once I was inside? 
[Defense counsel:] Yes, sir. 
[Deputy Bixby:] Nothing. That's what a safety sweep is. You go in, 
check the residence, come back out. 
(Tr.Vol.I, p.121, L.20-p.122, L.2 (emphases added).) 
Second Entry Into the Apartment 
Deputy Bixby then went to the front door,6 opened it, and he and the other 
deputies brought the still-handcuffed Luca and IVlr. Ligon-Bruno into the apartment, and 
"had them sit down in the chairs in the living room." (Tr.Vol. I, p.102, Ls.8-19, p.106, 
L.23-p.107, L.3.) 
During a second sweep of the apartment, deputies heard the toilet running, and 
removed the lid from the toilet tank, discovering "something that did not belong inside 
the toilet tank. And at that point we just left it inside the toilet tank." (Tr.Vol.I, p.104, 
L.19 - p.106, L.19.) Deputy Bixby deduced that the items in the toilet tank were the 
cause of the continuous running of the toilet because they appeared to be interfering 
5 The State, either in argument or through its witnesses, never contended that there was 
anything unlawful about the "weapons" observed inside the apartment. 
6 After Deputy Bixby's entry, it was discovered that the reason that the front door was 
not being used as the main entrance was because it had been taped shut after a recent 
break-in. (Tr.Vol.I, p.66, Ls.8-16.) 
5 
with the mechanism that stops the water from 'flowing. He did not remove the items or 
do anything else to stop the water from continuing to run. (Tr.Vol. I, p.110, Ls.1-18.) 
Deputy Franssen then learned that Mr. Ligon-Bruno was on felony probation, 
contacted the probation department, and received permission from a probation officer to 
search the home. It was only after receiving this permission that Deputy Franssen 
removed the items from the toilet tank, discovering two digital scales, "200 small, plastic 
Ziplock-type bags, hyperdermic [sic] needles, spoons, scrapers, straws." Deputy 
Franssen also searched the drawers in the bathroom after speaking with the probation 
department, discovering additional hypodermic needles, "playing cards that had been 
cut and modified, dirty spoons with residue on them that appeared to be consistent with 
the use of methamphetamine. A shaving bag that was located on the counter in the 
bathroom that contained a ledger." (Tr.Vol.I, p.35, L.1 -p.40, L.15.) 
At the hearing on his motion to suppress, at the request of both parties, tl1e 
district court took judicial notice of three documents from Kootenai County Criminal 
Case No. 05-17960, the case for which Mr. Ligon-Bruno was on unsupervised probation 
at the time of the instant offense. The first was the withheld judgment and sentencing 
disposition, containing, inter alia, terms and conditions of probation, including paragraph 
19, which states, "You shall submit to searches of your person, personal property, 
automobiles, and residence without a search warrant at the request of your probation 
officer." The second was the Petition for Unsupervised Probation and Case in 
Summary. The third was the district court's order converting Mr. Ligon-Bruno's 
probation to unsupervised probation, signed on May 22, 2008, 7 which ordered that he 
7 The searches of Mr. Ligon-Bruno's home that led to the charges in t~1is case occurred 
on January 4, 2010. (R., p.10.) 
6 
be "discharged from further supervised probation to unsupervised probation under all 
previously ordered terms and conditions until February 21 st [, 2010]." (Tr.Vol.I, p.145, 
L.2-p.147, L.11.) 
Following a preliminary hearing, Mr. Ligon-Bruno was charged with possession of 
a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. (R., pp.37, 48-49.) Defense counsel 
then filed a motion to suppress the evidence, requesting that all evidence gathered 
against Mr. Ligon-Bruno, including any statements, be suppressed because the 
warrantless search of his home violated both the United States Constitution and the 
Idaho Constitution. Mr. Ligon-Bruno also sought suppression of any statements made 
by the defendant, and any derivative evidence, because the statements were obtained 
while he was unlawfully detained in violation of both the United States Constitution and 
the Idaho Constitution. Finally, he sought suppression of any evidence obtained from a 
warrantless search of his cell phone. (R., pp.58-59.) Defense counsel filed a 
memorandum in support of the motion to suppress (R., p.62), the State filed a response 
(R., p. 72), and the parties filed further memoranda on additional issues that arose after 
the evidentiary hearings and the earlier memoranda. (R., pp.95, 102, 107.) 
Defense counsel advanced several arguments in support of suppression, two of 
which are relevant on appeal. First, he argued that the warrantless entry into 1\/lr. Ligon-
Bruno's apartment violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, section 17, of the Idaho Constitution, and required 
suppression of all resulting evidence, including statements made by Mr. Ligon-Bruno. 
(R., pp.63-64.) In a supplemental memorandum, defense counsel argued, inter alia, 
that "[b]ut for the initial warrantless entry, there is no indication that a probation search 
of this unsupervised probationer would have occurred[.]" (R., pp.102-06.) 
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Following argument on the motion, the district court issued an order granting the 
motion to suppress with respect to the contents of Mr. Ligon-Bruno's cell phone, while 
denying it in all other respects. (R., p.157.) The district court announced its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in open court. (Tr.Vol.II, p.11, L.21 - p.27, L.16.) The 
district court's holdings were that Deputy Bixby's initial sweep of the apartment was 
justified based on exigent circumstances. Specifically, the district court found, 
At this point the police did not know whether the man who was leaving the 
apartment belonged there. The police did not know whether there was a 
burglary going on in process. They did not know whether there were 
further perpetrators of a possible burglary within that apartment. They did 
not know whether there were potential victims of serious crime within that 
apartment who needed immediate and serious care of law enforcement. 
They had exigent circumstances to enter that apartment and find out if 
their presence was needed for very serious reasons for the safety of 
citizens' ongoing safety. 
(Tr.Vol.II, p.14, Ls.6-21.) 
With respect to the second entry, the district court concluded, 
The Court finds that to be not necessarily a reentry of the house. The 
police are already in the house. They are already conducting a safety 
sweep of that house. And just the fact that they bring the suspects into 
the house and then continue that safety sweep in a bit more detail does 
not mean that there was a reentry or that the safety sweep had lost its 
legitimacy and importance. The further, more detailed safety sweep was 
legitimate under the circumstances, and the Court finds it to be 
constitutionally supportable. 
(Tr.Vol.II, p.16, L.21 - p.17, L.5.) 
As for the lifting of the toilet's lid during the second entry, the district court 
concluded, 
The Court finds that it was reasonable for the police to lift the lid of that 
toilet to find out what was going on under exigent circumstances, given the 
circumstances of seeing the paraphernalia and the smell of burning 
marijuana and a continuously running toilet. There was the distinct 
likelihood that items of evidence were either being destroyed or in the 
water that was running continuously in the tank of that toilet. 
8 
(Tr.Vol.II, p.18, L.24- p.19, L.7.) 
Finally, with respect to the probation justification, the district court concluded, 
The Court specifically finds that under these particular circumstances, 
based upon the exigent circumstances, entry into this residence based 
upon what was seen in plain view as a result of those exigent 
circumstances, that the police were not simply requesting permission of 
the probation officer as a means of circumventing the warrant 
requirement. 
This Court does not find that the request had to be made by a specific 
probation officer specifically to Mr. Ligon-Bruno. 
The Court finds that, under all of these circumstances, this was a 
reasonable search of the apartment and is constitutionally supportable 
under the probation search exception to the warrant requirement. 
(Tr.Vol.II, p.26, Ls.14-25.) 
Following the partial denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Ligon-Bruno and the 
State entered into a Rule 11 plea agreement, the terms of which the district court 
summarized as follows: 
The Court has reviewed the plea agreement ... [it] calls for the State to file 
an Amended Information that accuses Mr. Ligon-Bruno with the felony 
offense of destruction of evidence. 
The plea agreement then calls from Mr. Ligon-Bruno to plead guilty 
pursuant to Alford v. North Caro/ina[8] to that amended charge of 
destruction of evidence. This will also be a conditional guilty plea wherein 
Mr. Ligon-Bruno reserves the right to appeal the Court's denial of the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. And then this is offered to the 
Court under a binding Rule 11 (f) basis where the parties agree and ask 
the Court to be bound by that agreement of a suspended prison sentence, 
no more county jail than what has already been served as a condition of 
probation, and three years of supervised probation. The Court would set 
the underlying sentence at its discretion. 
8 See Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
9 
(Tr.Vol.I, p.157, L.14 - p.158, L.11.) Mr. Ligon-Bruno pleaded guilty pursuant to this 
agreement. (Tr.Vol.I, p.167, Ls.7-12.) 
At sentencing, the district court followed the agreement, imposed and suspended 
a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and placed Mr. Ligon-Bruno on 
three years of supervised probation. (Tr.Vol. I, p.187, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Ligon-Bruno then 
filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (Notice of Appeal.9) 
9 A file-stamped copy of the Notice of Appeal is attached to a Motion to Augment filed 
on November 23, 2011. 
10 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ligon-Bruno's motion to suppress evidence 
discovered during three warrantless searches of his home because the State failed to 
meet its "heavy burden" of proving an exception to the warrant requirement? 
11 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ligon-Bruno's Motion To Suppress 
Evidence Discovered During Three Warrantless Searches Of His Home Because The 
State Failed To Meet Its "Heavy Burden" Of Proving An Exception To The Warrant 
Requirement 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ligon-Bruno asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress evidence discovered during three 10 warrantless searches of his home. First, 
the district court erred when it concluded that the exigent circumstances exception to 
the warrant requirement justified the initial entry into his home because the State failed 
to meet its "heavy burden" of proof for that exception. Second, assuming that the initial 
entry was justified, the district court erred when it concluded that the second warrantless 
entry was not a reentry of the home, and in holding that it was justified as a continuing 
protective sweep. Finally, the district court erred when it concluded that the third 
search, conducted at the request of a probation officer, was lawful. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ligon-Bruno's Motion To Suppress 
Evidence Discovered During Three Warrantless Searches Of His Home Because 
The State Failed To Meet Its "Heavy Burden" Of Proving An Exception To The 
Warrant Requirement 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
10 Mr. Ligon-Bruno has classified the various police intrusions into three searches 
because each resulted in the discovery and seizure of different pieces of evidence. The 
first occurred when Deputy Bixby entered to conduct his "safety sweep." The second 
occurred when the other deputies entered the apartment with the handcuffed Mr. Ligon-
Bruno and Luca. The third occurred after a probation officer authorized a thorough 
search of the apartment. 
12 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution contains a nearly-
identical provision. 
"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. The burden of proof 
rests with the State to demonstrate that the search either fell within a well-recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the 
circumstances." State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995). 0 [T]he police bear a 
heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify 
warrantless searches or arrests." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984). 
In his motion to suppress, Mr. Ligon-Bruno argued that the State had 
unconstitutionally searched his home without a warrant. (R., pp.63-64.) At the outset of 
the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State acknowledged that, due to the 
warrantless nature of the search, it bore the burden of establishing an exception to the 
warrant requirement. (Tr.Vol.I, p.8, Ls.7-10.) See Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290. 
The State advanced two arguments 11 in justifying the warrantless searches of 
Mr. Ligon-Bruno's home. First, the State argued that Mr. Ligon-Bruno's "probationary 
status effectively reduced [his] 4th Amendment rights and subjected his home and 
person to search." (R., p.72.) Second, at argument on the motion to suppress, the 
State argued that the police had "reasonable cause" to believe that a burglary was 
being committed, and that they were engaged in conducting "a protective sweep, trying 
11 In its initial response to Mr. Ligon-Bruno's motion to suppress, the State advanced an 
additional argument, asserting that Mr. Ligon-Bruno consented to the search of his 
home. (R., pp.81-85.) This claim was unsupported, and indeed contradicted, by 
evidence adduced at the suppression hearing. (Tr.Vol.I, p.25, Ls.19-24 (Deputy 
Franssen explaining that Deputy Bixby entered the apartment through the window as 
soon as Mr. Ligon-Bruno and Luca had been removed); p.100, Ls.11-21 (Deputy Bixby 
explaining that he entered the apartment through the window after having "secured" 
Mr. Ligon-Bruno and Luca).) The district court did not rule on the State's consent 
argument. 
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to see if there are any victims, if there is anybody else in there" when they discovered, 
"in plain view ... many, many items of paraphernalia and many, many weapons."12 
(Tr.Vol.II, p.9, L.21 - p.10, L.18.) The State closed by reemphasizing its probation 
argument, arguing, "If the Court finds that they had no justifiable reason to be there in 
that apartment, then we look at the probation conditions." (Tr.Vol. I I, p.10, Ls.19-23.) 
For the reasons set forth below, the State failed to meet its "heavy burden" of 
proof as to the exigent circumstances exception, and the probation exception argument 
is unpersuasive because the probation search was not valid. 
1. The State Failed To Meet Its "Heavy Burden" Of Proof That The Initial 
Entry Was Justified By The Exigent Circumstances Exception 
Mr. Ligon-Bruno asserts that the district court's holding that the initial warrantless 
entry into his home was justified under exigent circumstances, specifically the belief in 
the possibility that a burglary had been committed and that either victims or perpetrators 
were still inside, was erroneous because the State failed to meet its "heavy burden" of 
proof on the issue. 
In State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908 (Ct. App. 2006), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
ably and eloquently summarized the law concerning the exigent circumstances 
exception to the warrant requirement of the State and federal constitutions as follows: 
Under the exigent circumstances exception, agents of the state may 
engage in warrantless searches when there is compelling need for official 
action and no time to secure a warrant. However, a warrantless search 
under this exception must be strictly circumscribed by the nature of the 
exigency that justifies the intrusion. The test for application of this warrant 
exception is whether the facts as known to the agent at the time of entry, 
together with reasonable inferences, would warrant a reasonable belief 
12 Although it appears that the State was attempting to make an exigent circumstances 
argument, it never used the term, nor did it cite to any case law in support of its 
argument. (Tr.Vol.II, p.9, L.20 - p.11, L.16.) 
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that an exigency justified the intrusion. The burden is on the state to show 
the applicability of this exception to the warrant requirement. 
Id. at 912 (internal citations omitted). 
Idaho appellate courts have considered the applicability of the exigent 
circumstances exception to suspected burglaries several times. State v. Araiza, 147 
Idaho 371 (Ct. App. 2009) involved a remarkably similar initial suspicion of a residential 
burglary. In that case, an officer was on patrol at approximately 11 p.m. when he saw a 
man standing near the window of a house. "It appeared to the officer that the man had 
either just left the house through the window or was attempting to enter through the 
window." Id. at 373. 
The officer stopped to investigate, but by the time he had parked, the man was 
no longer visible. He knocked on the door, and an elderly woman, identified as Mary 
Mosqueda, who lived there answered. She told the officer that the name of the man he 
had seen was Roy, explained that he was inside, and said "that everything was fine." At 
the officer's request, Ms. Mosqueda had Roy approach the front door, at which point the 
officer obtained his full name (Roland Araiza), date of birth, and social security number. 
While the first officer checked Araiza's information in his patrol car, another officer 
"stood with Araiza at the door." Araiza, wearing only jeans, asked that officer if he could 
reenter the residence to get some additional clothing. After receiving permission, Araiza 
reentered the residence and closed the front door. Id. 
After failing to verify Araiza's identity, the first officer rejoined the second officer 
at the front door. They knocked, no one answered, and they discovered that the front 
door had been locked. A neighbor, identifying herself as Ms. Mosqueda's daughter, 
then arrived, "claimed not to know anyone by Araiza's name and told the officers that 
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there should be no one in the house aside from her mother and the daughter's two 
young sons." Next, 
Id. 
[t]he officers and Mosqueda's daughter continued knocking on the door 
and windows of the residence and the daughter tried to call her mother on 
her cell phone, but no one responded and the officers heard no noise 
coming from the house. A young man, later identified as Mosqueda's 
grandson, drove up to the scene, and also told the officer that he did not 
recognize Araiza's name and that no other adult should be in his 
grandmother's house. 
After several minutes of trying to contact the house's occupants, the 
officers could see through the windows that Mosqueda and Araiza were in 
the southwest corner of the house. Concerned for the safety of Mosqueda 
and her grandsons, the officers forcibly entered the home by breaking 
down a door. They found Araiza in the back bedroom with Mosqueda, 
where they arrested him for obstructing a police investigation. Mosqueda 
then informed them that she had not responded to their shouts and 
knocking because Araiza had not allowed anyone to answer the door. 
When asked whether Araiza had any additional clothing to take with him, 
Mosqueda led the officers to another bedroom and pointed to a jacket and 
unzipped duffel bag on the floor. Inside the bag, a glass pipe containing 
burn residue was clearly visible and a subsequent search of the bag 
revealed additional drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine. 
After being charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, Araiza filed a motion to suppress, challenging the warrantless entry 
into the home. The district court denied the motion and Araiza appealed Id. 
In affirming the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, the Court outlined 
the facts supporting a finding of exigent circumstances as follows: 
[W]hile his identity remained unclear, Araiza closed and locked the front 
door and none of the residents would open the door, answer the phone, or 
respond to knocking on the windows and beckoning from the officers. The 
officers were provided further reason to be concerned when a woman who 
identified herself as Mosqueda's daughter denied recognizing Araiza's 
name and informed them there should be no one else in the residence 
aside from Mosqueda and the daughter's two young children. 
Additionally, Mosqueda's grandson arrived on the scene and also denied 
recognizing Araiza's name and agreed with Mosqueda's daughter that no 
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one else should be in the home aside from his grandmother and two 
young cousins. 
Id. at 375-76. 
According to the Court, these facts gave officers "a reasonable concern that 
Araiza was an intruder and holding Mosqueda against her will." As for Araiza's 
argument that Mosqueda's "calm demeanor ... and assurances that everything was 
fine[,]" the Court concluded that "[g]iven the ignorance of Araiza's identity claimed by 
family members on the scene, it was not unreasonable for the officers to doubt 
Mosqueda's assurances." Id. at 376. 
In another case in which it considered the warrantless police entry into a home 
following the report of a possible intruder, the Idaho Court of Appeals, in State v. Rusho, 
110 Idaho 556 (Ct. App. 1986), held that 
even though the possibility of an intruder had not been wholly eliminated, 
we do not believe that such a bare possibility is sufficient to justify a 
warrantless, nonconsensual search. This is a question of constitutional 
dimension, weighing the state's interest in public safety against a citizen's 
right to maintain the privacy of her home. Fourth amendment values 
would be gravely impaired if the mere report of an intruder became a 
license for the police to enter a home and to search it without a warrant, 
over the homeowner's objection. A balance must be struck. We hold that 
such warrantless and nonconsensual searches are permissible only if 
there is probable cause to believe that an intruder exists and it reasonably 
appears that persons or property are in immediate danger. The initial 
report of an intruder, uncorroborated by other facts, is insufficient to 
overcome a homeowner's right to say "forget it." 
Id. at 560 (emphasis added). 
Unlike the facts in Araiza, once Mr. Ligon-Bruno and Luca had been removed 
from the apartment, there was no reason for the police to believe that anyone else was 
still inside. Additionally, prior to entering the apartment, the police had already verified, 
via Mr. Steger's mother, that he lived in one of the less than thirty apartments on that 
block. (Tr.Vol.I, p.80, Ls.3-19.) Finally, officers made no attempt to verify Mr. Ligon-
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Bruno's claim that he lived in the apartment until after they had conducted two 
searches. (Tr.Vol.I, p.35, Ls.16-23.) A simple call to the probation department, as 
eventually happened, would have resulted in the discovery that Mr. Ligon-Bruno had 
lived at the apartment for at least twenty months. (Tr.Vol.I, p.131, L.25 - p.132, L.10 
(Mr. Ligon-Bruno's former probation officer testifying that he last visited his apartment 
on April 16, 2008, and that it was his belief that it was still Mr. Ligon-Bruno's 
residence).) The State failed to establish facts to support a finding that exigent 
circumstances justified the initial entry into his apartment, which resulted in the 
discovery of drug paraphernalia, as well as the second and third searches, which 
disclosed the evidence which led to his conviction. 
As the Court of Appeals cautioned in Rusho, in exigent circumstances cases, "a 
balance must be struck" between legitimate public safety concerns and the right to be 
secure in one's home. Where, as here, the police possessed, at most, a belief that it 
was "entirely possible that a burglary, a theft, or other crime had been committed inside 
of the residence[,]"13 such a belief was insufficient to support a finding that probable 
cause existed and that it was reasonable to believe that persons or property were in 
immediate danger, as is required under Rusho. 
13 Deputy Franssen testifying that, prior to Mr. Ligon-Bruno and Luca exiting the 
apartment, he "believe[d] that it was entirely possible that a burglary, a theft, or other 
crime had been committed inside of the residence." (Tr.Vol.I, p.44, Ls.13-18.) When 
later asked what crime he believed had been committed at the time that he entered 
Mr. Ligon-Bruno's apartment, Deputy Franssen testified, "Potentially a burglary." 
(Tr.Vol.I, p.59, Ls.15-17.) As will be discussed next, there is no crime scene exception 
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 
(1978). 
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2. Assuming, Arguendo. That The Initial Entry Was Justified Based On 
Exigent Circumstances. The District Court Erred In Finding That The 
Second Entry Was Not A Reentry And That It Was Justified As A 
Continuing Protective Sweep 
Assuming, arguendo, that the initial entry by Deputy Bixby was justified under the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, the district court 
nevertheless erred when it found that the second entry was not a "reentry" and that it 
was justified as a continuation of the protective sweep. 
Absent exigent circumstances, there is no crime scene exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394-96 (1978). 
In Mincey, the Supreme Court recognized that "when the police come upon the scene of 
a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are 
other victims or if a killer is still on the premises" and that they "may seize any evidence 
that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities." Id. at 
392-93 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443 (1971 )). Unlike those cases, however, the police investigating Mincey had 
already located all of the persons in his apartment by the time that they began "a four-
day search that included opening drawers and ripping up carpets." Id., 437 U.S. at 393. 
The Court noted that "[t]here was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, 
or removed during the time required to obtain a search warrant." Id. at 394. 
The State, responsible for establishing the applicability of an exception to the 
warrant requirement, did not make an argument that there was no reentry, and the 
district court cited no case law for its conclusion that the entry of the home by additional 
officers following Deputy Bixby's initial sweep was "not necessarily a reentry of the 
house." The import of the reentry issue is that it was only after this reentry that officers 
discovered the evidence that resulted in the charges against Mr. Ligon-Bruno. (R., p.1 O 
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(charging Mr. Ligon-Bruno with possession of a controlled substance, specifically 
methamphetamine, with intent to deliver); pp.176-77 (the amended information, 
charging Mr. Ligon-Bruno with destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence by 
concealing drugs or drug paraphernalia in a toilet tank, the charge to which Mr. Ligon-
Bruno entered a conditional plea).) A search justified by exigent circumstances is only 
appropriate and justified when it is "strictly circumscribed by the exigency ... and cannot 
be used to support a general exploratory search ... an officer may not act outside the 
scope of the justification for the entry." State v. Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 17 (Ct. App. 
2001) (citing State v. Sai/as, 129 Idaho 432,435 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
Pursuant to Mincey, and assuming that Deputy Bixby's initial warrantless search 
of Mr. Ligon-Bruno's apartment was justified in an effort to discover victims in need of 
aid or additional perpetrators, there was no basis for the additional warrantless search 
of his home that occurred when the deputies took Mr. Ligon-Bruno and the two other 
detainees inside the apartment. This is especially true in light of the following testimony 
from Deputy Bixby: 
[Defense counsel:] When you made that sweep, sir, that first sweep as 
counsel puts it, what indications did you find that 
would lead you to believe that someone else was 
armed or dangerous or anything like that inside the 
residence? 
[Deputy Bixby:] Once I was inside? 
[Defense counsel:] Yes, sir. 
[Deputy Bixby:] Nothing. That's what a safety sweep is. You go in, 
check the residence, come back out. 
(Tr.Vol.I, p.121, L.20-p.122, L.2.) 
In light of the fact that any exigent circumstances were no longer present before 
the second search, the Court's determination that lifting the lid of the toilet during that 
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second search was justified by fear that evidence could be lost or destroyed was 
erroneous. According to the testimony elicited at the suppression hearing, it was not 
until the second search had begun that officers became concerned about the running of 
the toilet. (Tr.Vol.I, p.104, L.16 - p.106, L.19 (Deputy Bixby testifying that he only 
became concerned about the running toilet during the "second sweep").) As such, the 
first search could not have provided the basis for any additional exigency concerning 
the potential loss or destruction of evidence prior to the second search. 
3. The Third Search, Conducted At The Request Of A Probation Officer, 
Was Not Lawful 
Mr. Ligon-Bruno asserts that the third search, conducted under the direction of a 
probation officer, was not lawful because it was only authorized as a result of the 
discovery of contraband during the initial unlawful searches, thereby rendering any 
evidence discovered as a result fruit of the poisonous tree. 
The law is well-settled that evidence that is discovered through the exploitation of 
illegal acts of the police must be suppressed as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." See 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). In this case, the evidence is 
undisputed that a probation officer only requested that the police conduct a thorough 
search of Mr. Ligon-Bruno's apartment because he had been told of the contraband 
discovered during the first two warrantless searches. (Tr.Vol.I, p.139, L.7 - p.141, 
L.15.) As such, if this Court finds that the first two searches were unauthorized, then 




For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Ligon-Bruno respectfully requests tl1at this 
Court vacate his conviction because the district court erred when it found that the State 
had failed to meet its "heavy burden" of proving an exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
DATED this 28th day of November, 2011. 
SPE~Cf=R J. HAHN 
Depu~Btate Appellate Public Defender 
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